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Glen S. Fukushima*

United States-Japan Free Trade Area:
A Skeptical View**

Trade disputes have, over the past 20 years, become a permanent fixture
of the U.S.-Japan relationship. From the "textile wrangle" of the late
1960s to the FSX fighter aircraft controversy of the late 1980s, an evergrowing list of sectors, products, and services have demanded the attention of the two countries in the course of their politically cooperative yet
economically competitive postwar relationship.'
The most visible of these issues have been prominently covered in
the mass media: textiles, steel, automobiles, color television sets,
machine tools, beef, oranges, rice, semiconductors, construction services, and the FSX. But a long list of other items, many not so glamorous
or eye-catching, continue to disrupt the tranquility of the relationship.
When the two governments convene their biennial meeting of the U.S.Japan Trade Committee, 20 or 25 issues are routinely put on the agenda
* Glen S. Fukushima, an attorney, was educated at Stanford (A.B.), Harvard
(A.M.), and Harvard Law School (J.D.). He also completed all requirements except
the dissertation for a Ph.D. in Political Sociology at Harvard. From 1982 to 1984, he

was a Fulbright and Japan Foundation Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of
Tokyo. He is currently Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for

Japan and China, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office
of the President.
** The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not
represent in any way the views of the United States Government or any department
or agency thereof.
1. Among the many English-language books and articles on U.S.-Japan trade
conflicts, the following are especially informative: I. DESTLER, H. FUKUI & H. SATO,
THE TEXTILE

(1979); I.
(1982); I.
POLITICS

WRANGLE:

CONFLICT

IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN

RELATIONS,

1969-71

H. SATO, COPING WITH U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC CONFLICTS
DESTLER, H. SATO, P. CLAPP & H. FUKUI, MANAGING AN ALLIANCE: THE
OF U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS (1976); T. McCRA-vW, AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN
DESTLER &

(1986); C. PRESTOwITz, TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE
LEAD (1988); andJohnson, How to Think About Economic Competitionfrom Japan, in THE
TRADE CRISIS: How WILLJAPAN RESPOND? (K. Pyle ed. 1987). Although not specifically on U.S.-Japan trade, the following book sheds considerable light on the intractability of the bilateral trade problems: K. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE
POWER: PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION (1989).
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by the U.S. as problems that require immediate attention. 2
I. The U.S.-Japan Trade Problem
The "U.S.-Japan Trade Problem" comprises three dimensions. First,
the size of the trade deficit is both an economic and political problem,
although many economists would argue that it is the global deficit, not
the bilateral deficit, that is an economic problem. Due in part to yen
appreciation, U.S. exports to Japan in 1988 were up 35 percent over
1987, compared to a rise of only 6 percent in Japanese exports to the
U.S. But the difference in the absolute levels of the trade flows meant
that the imbalance only narrowed from $59.8 to $55.4 billion. This was
42 percent of the U.S. global deficit. The 7 percent decline in the U.S.
bilateral deficit with Japan was far smaller than the 21 percent decline in
the U.S. global deficit. The imbalance with the European Community
dropped 47 percent and that with the Asian newly industrialized economies ("NIEs") decreased 16 percent. No matter how one measures it,
the magnitude of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan is enormous.3
Second, the composition of the bilateral deficit is a matter of growing
concern. U.S. manufactured products have demonstrated their competitiveness in all major markets around the world except in Japan. The
ratio of imports to GNP inJapan, 6.6 percent, is lower than the 9.5 percent for the U.S. and 20.7 percent for Germany. The disparity between
ratios of manufactured imports to GNP is even greater: 21.3 percent for
Korea, 10.5 percent for Germany, 7.3 percent for the U.S., and only 2.4
percent for Japan. Of all lesser developed country ("LDC") exports of
manufactured products in 1987, the U.S. took in 52.6 percent, the European Community ("EC") 26.1 percent, and Japan only 9.1 percent. 4
Japan exhibits a bias against importing manufactured products, even
when they are clearly more competitive than domestic products. 5
Third, the anecdotal evidence provided by American companies of
market barriers in Japan is overwhelming. These include Japanese government laws, regulations, and administrative guidance; corporate policies, practices, and industrial structure; and attitudinal barriers
2. For a discussion of the range of trade issues negotiated in bilateral fora, see

Fukushima, The U.S.-Japan Trade Conflict: .4 View From Washington, 6

BULL. INT'L HOUSE

(Spring 1986) (Issue No. 2).
3. Data compiled by the Office of the United States Trade Representative

OFJAPAN

(USTR), Department of Commerce, and the International Monetary Fund.

4. GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1987-88.
5. "The most recent study has been conducted by Robert Z. Lawrence of Brookings .... His conclusions are striking: Japanese imports of manufactured imports are
'... about 40 percent lower than one would expect of a typical industrial economy.'
...
Applying Lawrence's order of magnitude adjustment to Japan's estimated 1987
manufactures imports suggests thatJapanese manufactures imports would have been
roughly $40 billion larger." ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS ("ACTPN"), ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN TRADE PROBLEM 76-77 (1989) [hereinafter ACTPN Report]. For a discussion of the importance of the composition of
trade, see S. COHEN &J. ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING MATTERS: THE MYTH OF THE POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMY (1987).
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including a buy-Japanese mentality. Whether or not these barriers were
intentionally erected to exclude foreigners, the effect is the same: one
American company after another has complained to the Administration
and to Congress about the difficulty of exporting to or investing in
Japan. Not all of these claims are legitimate, but enough meritorious
cases exist to cast serious doubt on Japanese arguments that American
'6
companies are just "not trying hard enough."
H. Background of the FTA Idea
It is in the context of these persistent and seemingly intractable trade
problems that the idea of a U.S.-Japan Free Trade Area ("FTA") has
emerged. No one really knows precisely when the notion first surfaced,
but by the mid-1980s U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield was
heard to include in his speeches his "personal" idea that the two countries needed a framework along the lines of an FTA to better manage
"the most important relationship in the world, bar none. ' 7
When newly installed Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita visited
Washington in January, 1988, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd suggested to the Prime Minister that it might be worthwhile for the two
sides to consider the feasibility of an FTA. On June 15, 1988, Senator
Lloyd Bentsen, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to the U.S. International Trade Commission
("ITC") requesting an investigation of "the pros and cons of entering
into negotiations with Japan to explore the possibility of establishing a
8
,
U.S.-Japan free trade area ....
The ITC Report-based on interviews with 122 individuals, 34 written submissions, and a public hearing-was an opinion study rather than
an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of an FTA. The Institute
for International Economics in Washington, D.C. convened a two-day
conference entitled "More Free Trade Areas?" on October 31 and
November 1, 1988. And the RAND Corporation, the Santa Monica, California-based think tank, has undertaken a major study of the U.S.-Japan
ETA concept.
As is often the case with "new approaches" to the bilateral relationship, however, Japan has been notably more diligent than the U.S. in
assessing the costs and benefits of establishing an FTA. Official or
quasi-official studies were initiated under the auspices of the Ministry of
6. See The Role ofJapanese Trade Barriers, in ACTPN Report, supra note 5, at 53-82

(ch. 5). See also Kreinen, How Closed is Japan's Market? Additional Evidence,

THE

WORLD ECONOMY, Dec. 1988, at 529-42.

7. The most recent iteration of this famous phrase can be found in the last sentence of Mansfield, The US. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies, 68 FOR. AFF. 1, 15
(1989).
8. This letter is reproduced on pages B-2 and B-3 of Pros and Cons of Initiating
Negotiations with Japan to E.xplore the Possibility of a CS.-Japan Free Trade Area Agreement,
USITC Pub. 2120, Inv. No. 332- TA-255 (Sept. 1988) (U.S. International Trade
Commission report to Senate Finance Committee) [hereinafter ITC Report].
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Foreign Affairs ("MOFA"), the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry ("MITI"), the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), and the Economic
Planning Agency ("EPA"). 9 There were unconfirmed reports that the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries ("MAFF") was investigating the implications of an FTA for bilateral agricultural trade, and a
number ofJapanese private research institutes were known to be at work
analyzing one aspect or another of the FTA idea.
These reports, conferences, and the media accounts that have
accompanied them have, among some quarters, generated considerable
interest and expectation in the FTA as a promising approach to resolve
the seemingly intractable trade conflicts that have afflicted the bilateral
relationship over the past two decades. Yet the concept of a U.S.-Japan
FTA is mired in confusion. Advocates are often using the term "FTA"
to mean entirely different things.
This confusion is fraught with danger, since conceptual clarity, precision, and specificity are essential for both countries if an FTA-however defined-is to be considered as a serious option for the U.S.-Japan
relationship in the 1990s. 10 A mismatch between the means (implementing steps) and the objectives (ultimate goals) with respect to an
FTA could have severely counterproductive effects for the bilateral relationship, especially if both sides enter into such discussions without first
establishing a clear understanding within each country (and between the
two) of the specific scope, nature, and intended results of an FTA.
HI. Motivations for an FTA
One way to sort through the confusion surrounding the FTA idea is to
ask what motivates its adherents. Two motivations immediately stand
out: political and economic.
A.

Political Rationale

The political motivation is based on the conviction that the political and
military security dimensions are the bedrock of the bilateral relationship. Adherents of this view are troubled by the potential spillover of
the trade conflicts into what they see as a smooth and harmonious political and military security relationship. Japan being a military ally, this
view holds, we should try our best to minimize conflicts in trade or economic matters because these epiphenomenal irritants could eventually
sour the overall alliance. Thus, Ambassador Mansfield, in his submis9. For a Japanese perspective on FTAs, see Shirakawa, Xichi-Bei Jiyu Boeki Ken
Koso no Haikei [Background of the Japan-U.S. Free Trade Area Concept], KEIZAI
SEMINAA, No. 407, Dec. 1988, pp. 26-31. Shirakawa is Director of the Second International Economic Affairs Division in the Economic Planning Agency. See also
Nakatani, Xichi-Bei Jiyu Boeki Kyotei o Kento Suru Imi: [Assessing a U.S.-Japan Free
Trade Agreement], SHUKAN Toyo KEIZAI, July 23, 1988, at 96-99.
10. For the pitfalls of miscommunication in bilateral negotiations, see Fukushima,
The Nature of U.S.-Japan Government Negotiations in THE U.S.-JAPAN
A NEW ERA IN LEGAL AND ECONOMIc RELATIONS (forthcoming).

BILATERAL

SESSION:
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sion dated July 7, 1988 to the ITC study discussed above, writes as
follows:
The basis for my suggestion that we at least study the shape of a free
trade agreement is the belief that the U.S. should switch from approaches
which politicize trade issues, exacerbate friction, raise emotional stakes,
erode public support here [i.e., in Japan] for American objectives and risk
undermining both countries' commitment to the alliance. We have no
alternatives at present to our piecemeal
approach which would last-but
1
should not-into the next century.'
In a recent article in ForeignAffairs, he sums up this view in the following
words:
[O]ur relationship has been overshadowed in the media and in our bilateral dialogue by a seemingly endless series of disputes over market access
and unfair trade practices. At times these frictions have spilled over and
threatened to damage other areas of our economic partnership as well as
our political, security and diplomatic cooperation ....

I have also sug-

gested that the United States should look at some variations of a free
trade agreement to see if there are not ways of applying this approach to
trade negotiations with Japan. 12
This view is welcomed by many Japanese as well. Former MITI
Vice-Minister for International Affairs Makoto Kuroda, for instance, had
the following to say in October 1988 at the Institute for International
Economics conference cited above:
An aggravated relationship between Japan and the U.S., which are
two of the largest economic powers, would have an adverse effect not
only on the development of themselves, but also on the world economy as
a whole. Therefore,Japan and the U.S. have a special and great responsibility to formulate a new relationship in which we can facilitate smoother
trade relations and contribute to world economic development. From the
standpoint of finding a new relationship,
an expanded concept of the FTA
13
could be one avenue worth exploring.
Here again, the goal of an FTA is seen not to remedy materially the
trade imbalance between the two countries or to undertake changes in
policies or practices to bring about concrete economic outcomes.
Rather, it is to "facilitate smoother trade relations," i.e., reduce the level
of trade conflict. Kuroda was more explicit in his desire to contain the
politicization of trade in an article he wrote for the Japan Economic
Journal:
[A]s goods-oriented friction is supplanted by institution-oriented friction,
problems in bilateral relations will become more structural and political
in nature.... Such frictions should not be allowed to escalate needlessly.
Rather than repeating the past approach of simply "coping with friction,"
11. Reproduced in ITC Report, supra note 8, at A-2 to A-4.
12. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 3-4, 8.
13. M. Kuroda, My View on the Strengthening ofJapan-U.S. Cooperation and the
Concept of a Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 1 (Oct. 31, 1988) (unpublished
manuscript).
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we should take a more forward-looking approach which seeks common
goals through joint efforts. 14

Kuroda's former boss at MITI, former Vice-Minister Shinji Fukukawa,
expressed a similar view in a conference in Japan in November 1988:
As economic powers with enormous responsibilities in managing the
world economy, Japan and the U.S. need to consider a new structure for
their mutual relationship, one that will help them handle conflicts effectively
so that they can continue to contribute to development of the world economy.... From this perspective, a Japan-U.S. free trade concept deserves
examination as a means of enhancing relations between our two

nations. 15
B.

Economic Effectiveness

In contrast to this view-i.e., that the primary function of an FTA should
be the political one of reducing bilateral trade frictions-is the notion
that an FTA would be more economically effective than the current process-oriented, piecemeal approach. Adherents of this view are dissatisfied by what they see as the endless rounds of trade negotiations
between the two governments. These negotiations more often than not
eventually lead to agreements, but these agreements-often establishing
more transparency in procurement procedures-do not necessarily produce the intended results: increased sales to the Japanese market of
U.S. products and services.
It is this frustration with the lack of concrete results that has led the
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiation ("ACTPN"), a
private-sector advisory group to the President, to issue a recommendation in February 1989 that "given the different structures of the two
[U.S. and Japanese] economies, trade policy solutions lie somewhere
between free trade and managed trade. .

.

. A results-oriented trade

strategy would provide concrete evidence that U.S.-Japan negotiations
are succeeding.

...
16 Although the ACTPN report explicitly rejects

the FTA idea as ineffective, the same dissatisfaction with the processoriented, piecemeal approach can be seen behind certain initiatives from
Capitol Hill supporting a U.S.-Japan FTA.
Citing calls for such an FTA by Ambassador Mansfield and the
introduction of legislation in support of an ETA by Congressmen Gibbons and Crane, Senator Max Baucus of Montana had the following to
say in October 1988:
Given the magnitude and complexity of the bilateral problems, a sweeping economic accord is needed-one much more extensive than the Canada FTA....

We should negotiate a bilateral accord that establishes a

14. Kuroda, Japan-U.S. Relations Need Fresh Framework, Japan EconomicJournal, Dec. 31, 1988 &Jan. 7, 1989, at 11.
15. S.Fukukawa, Asian-Pacific Cooperation and theJapan-U.S. Free Trade Concept, 12 (Nov. 14, 1988) (paper presented at the Fifth U.S.-Japan Council Meeting)
(unpublished manuscript) (emphasis added). Note the focus on "handling conflicts."
16. ACTPN Report, supra note 5, at vii.
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process for trade and economic coordination between the U.S. andJapan.
The accord should have three major elements: (1) a macroeconomic
coordination agreement, (2) a trade agreement, and (3) a burden sharing
agreement.17
Although Baucus has been careful to point out that "[g]iven the pervasiveness of Japanese trade barriers, a true FTA is probably not in the
U.S.' best interests," few observers have noted the differences between
his idea of a "bilateral accord" and the more general notion of an
FTA. 18
Thus, as seen at least in the mass media and in the public perception, a bilateral FTA is being advocated by a wide range of responsible
parties-from American ambassadors to former senior Japanese Government officials to prominent members of Congress. Only by pinpointing what each advocate sees as the ultimate objective or motivation of an
FTA can we come to understand what kind of an FTA is really being
considered. Take the Baucus proposal, for example. Although
macroeconomic coordination might be acceptable to both sides if it did
not go much beyond the current G-7 framework, forcingJapan to implement "trade-flow targets" and significantly increase "direct payments"
to the U.S. to "ease the unequal security burden"' 9 may well exacerbate, not reduce, conflict between the two countries-precisely what
those motivated by political considerations hope an FTA would avoid.

IV.

Limitations of an FTA

Whether one's motivations are political or economic, the question
remains: Is a U.S.-Japan FTA a good idea? One needs to answer this
question with caution, since it contains several analytic elements: (1)
Definition, i.e., what is meant by an "FTA"? (2) Perspective, i.e., a
"good idea" from whose standpoint-the U.S.? Japan? the "relationship"? (3) A "good idea" in what sense-reducing the trade imbalance?
eliminating Japanese trade barriers? preserving an open market in the
U.S.?
My tentative and preliminary answer is as follows: If one views the
FTA as the kind of bilateral accord reached recently between the U.S.
and Canada, an FTA would confer more advantages to Japan than to the
U.S. Thus, such an arrangement would not satisfactorily address the
"U.S.-Japan Trade Problem" as understood by most Americans. This is
not to deny that such an arrangement might have the effect of quelling
the politicization of trade conflicts over the short term. But once the
economic effects of an FTA become evident, Americans are not likely to
17. M. Baucus, Statement at Institute for International Economics Conference on
Bilateral Trade Agreements, 6 (Oct. 31, 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
18. For a detailed explanation of Senator Baucus's proposal, see Baucus, .4 .\e,
Trade Strategy: The Casefor BilateralAgreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1989); see also
Baucus, Pacific Overture, THE INT'L ECONoMY, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 70.
19. Baucus, Pacific Overture, supra note 18, at 70-71.
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be pleased. There are at least five reasons for skepticism regarding a
U.S.-Japan FTA.
A.

Inability to Address Core Problems

An FTA, as traditionally conceived, is aimed at the elimination of such
visible barriers as tariffs, quotas, and government subsidies. Yet these
are not the real barriers to gaining access to the Japanese market.
Due in large part to bilateral and multilateral negotiations over the
past 20 years, Japan's official, visible barriers are among the lowest in
the world. Average tariffs are 2.5 percent, compared to 2.8 percent for
the EC, 3.4 percent for the U.S., and 4.0 percent for Canada. Import
quotas number 23, more than any advanced industrialized country
except France, but 22 of these are in agricultural products and likely to
be reduced in the near term. 20 A series of "market opening measures"
over the past decade, culminating in the "Action Program" ofJuly 1985,
have simplified import procedures and eased certain standards and cer21
tification requirements.
Changes in laws and regulations, however, do not necessarily equal
liberalization in fact. Tetsundo Iwakuni, a Japanese senior vice president of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets and a businessman well versed in
Japanese financial markets, argues that there is:
a misconception among Americans and other foreigners who wish to do
business in Japan and who wish to be treated fairly by the Japanese government and Japanese companies. The misconception is that changes in
the laws will lead to a change in traditional Japanese relationships and
Japanese society.... In the present ordeal, we learned a valuable lesson:
the Japanese will willingly agree to the concept of free, fair, and open
in our path
markets but will do whatever they can to place small2obstacles
2
in the hope, perhaps, that we will tire and give up.
In addition to these official government impediments are a second
level of barriers best characterized as corporate, institutional, or organizational. These include the symbiotic relationship between government
and business (including "administrative guidance"), the tight-knit relationships between affiliated companies in keiretsu groups, and the multilayered and exclusive distribution system. These structural features of
the Japanese economy make it difficult for any newcomer to enter the
market, but especially for the foreign newcomer with few domestic
23
allies, little goodwill, and limited contacts to rely on for assistance.
20. Data on tariffs and quotas are from JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
("JETRO"), HANDY FACTS ON U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8 (1988).
21. GOVERNMENT-RULING PARTIES JOINT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PROMOTION OF
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC MEASURES, THE OUTLINE OF THE ACTION PROGRAM FOR
IMPROVED MARKET ACCESS (1985).
22. T. Iwakuni, Laws May Change ButJapanese Society Does Not (text of speech)
(unpublished manuscript).
23. For a discussion of keiretsu, see VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 1. See also Yamamura
& Vandenberg, Japan"s Rapid-Growth Policy on Tial: The Television Case in LAW AND
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A third level of barriers is attitudinal. This is manifested in several
ways. One is the notion that Japan, being a small, weak island nation
devoid of natural resources, must import vast quantities of raw materials, add value in Japan, and export equally vast shipments of manufactured products in order to survive. A corollary of this is that Japan
foreign industrial prodcannot afford the luxury of importing expensive
24
supercomputers.
American
as
such
ucts
A second aspect of this attitudinal barrier is that Japanese products
are superior to foreign products across the board, hence explaining low
import penetration by Japan's trading partners. When it is pointed out
that American products often outcompete Japanese products in thirdcountry markets, the response is that the Japanese market requires
''extra effort."
A third aspect is the idea that Japan is "unique": Japanese intestines are longer than Western intestines, so Japanese are unable to consume beef (then why maintain quotas?); Japanese snow is different from
foreign snow, so Japanese ski standards must be changed, to the detriment of American and European ski manufacturers; and Japanese soil is
different from foreign soil, so American construction companies cannot
hope to win bids on Japanese public works projects. 2 5 Some Japanese
actually believe these arguments about uniqueness, whereas others
merely use them as arguments to justify their protectionist policies and
practices.
These attitudinal barriers should not be confused with what is
sometimes termed "cultural conflict" (bunka masatsu) between the U.S.
and Japan. First, culture implies a certain permanence, inherence, and
immutability that does not apply to attitudes. Just as Japanese products
20 years ago did not generally enjoy a reputation for high quality in this
country and just as American products 10 years ago were not routinely
derided in Japan for low quality, unreliability, and poor workmanship,
attitudes can change much more quickly than culture. Second, similarity
in cultures is no guarantee against trade conflicts, as attested to by the
recurring frictions between the U.S. and the EC. Third, as a tactical
matter, excoriating another country's culture is hardly apt to win sympathy in that country's government or public and may even inflame the
26
sensitivity to racial victimization for which Japan is not unknown.
TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES (G.

Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1986).

24. Despite holding over 80 percent of the world market for supercomputers,
U.S. manufacturers have been virtually excluded from the public sector supercomputer market in Japan. See Sun, A Global Supercomputer Race for High Stakes, 243 Sci-

1004-06 (1989).
25. The beef and soil examples are based on personal experience in bilateral
negotiations. The ski case, which came to me second-hand from Donald Abelson, a
USTR standards expert, is documented in The UniqueJapanese,FORTUNE, Nov. 24,
1986, at 8.
26. These feelings are abetted by such articles as that by Boaz, Eellow PerilReinfects
ENCE

America, Wall St.J., Apr. 7, 1989.
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All of this is to say that barriers in Japan are complex, multilayered,
and-although perhaps once inspired, created, or orchestrated by the
government-now less under the government's direct control. Thus an
FTA is unlikely to address the core barriers that bar access to the Japanese market.
B. Mutuality
An FTA implies mutuality. That is, both parties bring something to the
table. In this case, such items as tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and other
trade-distorting government policies and practices would presumably be
put on the table by both sides. But since Japan has few remaining official, visible barriers, it is likely to give up less than is the U.S., where the
importance of visible barriers is far greater than in Japan.
Take, for example, the voluntary export restraints, voluntary
restraint agreements, and orderly marketing arrangements currently in
place between the U.S. and Japan. Dismantling these may lead to a
greater increase in Japanese exports to the U.S. of automobiles, steel,
textiles, machine tools, etc. than is compensated for by additional U.S.
exports to Japan resulting from a reduction ofJapanese tariffs and quotas. This could lead to a widening, not lessening, of the bilateral trade
imbalance.
In addition, many Americans may well be puzzled as to why, in the
event of an FTA, there should be any mutuality at all. Given the $55
billion trade imbalance and the widely accepted truth-even in Japanthat the U.S. market is the most open in the world, the Congress, the
business community, and the general public are all likely to question, if
not actively oppose, the notion that the U.S. should open its doors even
wider to Japan. Certain Japanese observers have also expressed difficulty in understanding why the U.S. would want to make it easier for
Japan to export to the U.S. while gaining so little in return in terms of
substantial access to the Japanese market.
C. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
One of the most attractive elements of an FTA, from the Japanese perspective, is the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism. If
based on the provisions for antidumping and countervailing duty matters in the U.S.-Canada FTA, binational panels comprising five members
would be chosen from a roster of Japanese and Americans. Each side
chooses two panelists, subject to preemptory challenges. The fifth panelist is selected by agreement between the parties, by the first four panelists, or by lot, as may be necessary. A panel must render its final
27
decision within 315 days.
27. See Chapter Nineteen of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, entitled
"Bilateral Panel Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases." For commentary, see D. McRae & D. Steger, Understanding the Free Trade
Agreement: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the University of Ottawa, Faculty
of Law (Common Law),Jan. 22, 1988.
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Many Japanese view a binational dispute settlement mechanism as
the sine qua non of an FTA. For, to an unprecedented degree, it would
give the Japanese Government the opportunity to participate directly in
dispute settlement on trade matters between the U.S. and Japan.2 8 No
longer wouldJapan have to be subjected to what it views as "unilateral"
and "discriminatory" judgments by the U.S. Government in trade disputes under such provisions of U.S. trade law as Sections 201, 301, and
29
337, or antidumping and countervailing duties.
Even if such matters are not placed entirely within the jurisdiction
of the binational panels, many in Japan would welcome the opportunity
to at least moderate the ability of the U.S. to act unilaterally. Many
Americans, on the other hand, would question the wisdom of opening
up even more the already transparent process of implementing U.S.
trade laws. After all, it was in part congressional concern that the
Administration was not adequately enforcing the trade laws on behalf of
U.S. commercial interests that led to the enactment of the Trade Act of
1988.30
D.

Impact on Multilateralism

Even if an FTA were somehow fashioned to be attractive to both the
U.S. and Japan, its effects on the multilateral system need to be considered. These involve both short-term and long-term effects. In the short
term, concentrating resources on a bilateral FTA is certain to detract
from the ongoing efforts to conclude the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations by the target date of 1990. In the long-term, a U.S.Japan FTA, in the wake of the U.S.-Canada FTA and EC 1992, could
have the effect of moving the world economic system toward regional
trading blocs.
Gardner Patterson, the former Director-General of the GATT,
summed up these concerns as follows:
For a believer in the virtues-and the feasibility if pursued vigorously
by the United States-of an updated, broadened and strengthened
GATT-type non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, the implications of a spread of U.S.-fostered FTAs are down right ominous. The
major consequences seem likely to be: (a) an uncertain effect on the
amount and composition of world trade but clearly inferior in both
respects to comparable multilateral reductions in trade barriers; (b) a sub28. As early as fall, 1988, Japanese newspapers reported that the Japanese Government was planning to propose to the new U.S. Administration a bilateral dispute
settlement mechanism similar to that established under the U.S.-Canada FTA. See
*ichi-Bei Boeki ni Funso Sliori Kikan [Dispute settlement mechanism for U.S.-Japan
Trade], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Oct. 5, 1988, at 1.
29. A typicalJapanese criticism of the U.S. Government's use of trade law actions
againstJapan can be found in U S.-Japan Friction: Interiview with FormerMITI Vice Minister Makoto Kuroda, SHOKUN, Oct. 1988. See also Kuroda,JapanIs Getting a Bum Rap on
Trade, THE INT'L ECONOMY, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 48-55.
30. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988).
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stantial diminution in the accomplishments of the Uruguay Round; (c) a
great increase in trade-related political frictions around the world; (d) a
weakening of the present fragile international mechanisms for "managing" the trading system; and (e) other nations concluding that the United
States has abandoned its crucial role as supporter of a multilateral system
leading them to emulate the United States and strike such bilateral deals
3 1
as they can.
E.

Impact on Other Trading Partners

Patterson's final point-the impact on other nations of yet another FTA
involving the U.S.-is an immediate problem. Many have advocated
concluding an FTA with some other nations or regions before entering
into FTA talks with Japan. Among those most often mentioned are
32
Mexico, Taiwan, Korea, ASEAN, and even the European Community.
In part, the concern about a U.S.-Japan FTA centers on the magnitude of the undertaking-with reference to both process and results.
With regard to process, few believe that an FTA with Japan will be easier
to conclude than that with Canada, which took 16 months of intensive
and grueling negotiations-this despite the historical, institutional, cultural, and linguistic similarities and geographical proximity of the two
countries. With regard to results, engaging the world's two largest
economies-comprising nearly 40 percent of the world's GNP-in an
FTA is certain to have massive repercussions for the two countries' trading partners. The impact on the LDCs in particular is not likely to be
33
positive.
V.

Conclusion

This discussion has indicated two major motivations for, and five limitations to, negotiating an FTA between the U.S. and Japan. The two factors-motivations and limitations-are, of course, closely related. For
the motivations will define what type of FTA is favored, and this in turn
will determine the nature and extent of the limitations.
To simplify, those advocating an FTA based on a political rationale-containing and managing trade conflicts so they do not harm the
political and military security relationship-appear to favor what might
be termed a "minimalist" FTA. This would focus primarily on the
reduction of formal, visible barriers, with perhaps some attention paid,
31. G. Patterson, More Free Trade Areas: Implications for GATT and the World
Trading System 21-22 (Nov. 1, 1988) (presented at the Institute for International
Economics) (unpublished manuscript). See also Aho, Vore Bilateral Trade Agreements
Would Be a Blunder: What the New President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 26 (1989).
32. "I think we should battle through the tough negotiations with [the] European
Community first. That, after the experience with Canada, should educate and prepare us for a negotiation with Japan." R. Gephardt, More Free Trade Areas? 7 (Oct.
31, 1988) (presented at the Institute for International Economics) (unpublished
manuscript).
33. W. Fritsch, The New Minilateralism and Developing Countries (Nov. 1, 1988)
(presented at the Institute for International Economics) (unpublished manuscript).
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fields, such as
as Makoto Kuroda suggests, to "establishing rules in new
34
services, investment, and intellectual property rights."
Those advocating an FTA based on economic effectiveness-restoring the trade balance, selling substantially more American goods and
services to the Japanese market-appear to favor what might be termed
a "maximalist" FTA. This would involve a results-oriented approach
including the establishment of "trade-flow targets" 3 5 and "market share
targets ...in critical sectors" 3 6 as well as burden-sharing schemes.
Clearly, the two approaches are at odds. Each emanates from a different understanding of the problems confronting the U.S.-Japan relationship. And each may reflect different philosophies of how
international trade, markets, and economies function. Yet the public
discussion to date on this issue of a bilateral FTA has tended to lump all
FTA ideas together, contributing to an already confusing discourse on
37
how best to improve the troubled U.S.-Japan economic relationship.
My discussion here does not address that larger question. But if it has
clarified the motivations for and limitations to a U.S.-Japan FTA, it will
have served its purpose.

34. Kuroda, supra note 14 (emphasis added). Note here the traditional process-

oriented, rule-based approach that requires no commitment to results.
35. Baucus, Pacific Overture, supra note 18, at 70.
36. Id. at 71.
37. For a penetrating analysis of how ideological blinders obscure the search for

realistic solutions to the trade problems, seeJohnson, TheJapanesePoliticalEconomy: A
Crisis in Theory, 2 EmIcs
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(1988).

